While the international system is undergoing major geopolitical changes, states must redefine their identities and roles. The increasing geopolitical uncertainties stemming from the ensuing US-Russia and US-China great power competitions, are gradually unsettling the stable cognitive environments, which are eroding not only the physical security of the constituents of the international system, that is the protection of their territory and governance structures, but also their ontological security, referring to the states’ identities and selves. With China and Russia openly challenging leadership of the US and the normative security community of the EU as a core constituent of the US-led Rules-based International Order (RIO), specifically small states, which are caught in the middle of the US-China-Russia triangular relationship, are vulnerable to such major identity challenges, affecting their behavior, relations with one another and the security of their self. The South Caucasus, in particular, is prone to such great power competitions, as it is located at the intersection of where US, EU, Chinese and Russian interests are colliding, which may perturb, redefine and transform the South Caucasian republics’ identities and selves. Notably, there is an on-going geopolitical and geo-economic contest over the South Caucasus due to its strategic location between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, with multiple institutions and initiatives running parallel with each other. While Azerbaijan has developed a consistent multi-vector foreign policy and identity amid the on-going competitions, Georgia and Armenia have been exposing distinct foreign policy oscillations as they are struggling to find coherence. This raises the following questions: (1) How are the geopolitical risks deriving from the US-China and the US-Russia great power competitions manifested in the ontological (in-)securities of Georgia and Armenia? (2) How do Tbilisi and Yerevan behave amid their struggle to accommodate conflicting narratives when seeking to cope with the intensifying great power competitions? Findings suggest that amid intensifying great power competitions, Armenia and Georgia are struggling to accommodate conflicting foreign policy directions. Yerevan's relations with Russia have revitalized, casting doubts about Armenia's genuine interest in Prime Minister Pashinyan's declarative pursuit of European integration. Tbilisi, likewise, has greatly improved its relations with Russia and deepened its cooperation with China, which has eroded its path towards EU and NATO membership and triggered mass protests among the pro-European public opinion. In both instances, the foreign policy oscillations and the strong Russian influence have impeded an adoption of a cohesive national identity.

After the end of the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, fundamental changes took places in Armenia’s security environment. The post-war period has witnessed Russia’s partial disengagement from and increased Western engagement in regional affairs. In addition to that, Yerevan became increasingly dissatisfied with the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Russia’s refusal to protect Armenia or Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan’s large-scale attacks which led to a point where Armenia froze its membership in the alliance and started to openly and consistently criticize Russia. Russia stopped being the main arms supplier to Armenia for the first time and withdrew its border troops from the Armenian-Iranian border. Fundamental changes occurred in public perceptions as Russia lost the overwhelming public support in Armenia, with countries like the US, France, Iran and India becoming more trusted countries as security or political partners. At the same time, at Armenia’s request, the European Union deployed a civilian monitoring mission along the Armenian-Azerbaijani frontline. Yerevan started to openly entertain the idea of leaving the CSTO and joining or at least getting closer to the European Union. These developments necessitate revisiting the question whether the era of Armenia’s pro-Russian foreign policy is truly over – which is the central question of this research. It studies the discursive aspect of Armenia’s relations with Russia and the West, then compares it to developments on the ground. Theory wise, it will apply the concept of bandwagoning to understand whether Armenia is tilting towards the West or still exercising a pro-Russian foreign policy.

This article explains why hedging strategies by small secondary states in Eurasia succeed in some contexts but fail or collapse in others. Focusing on Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, it argues that variation in hedging outcomes is driven by the interaction of five dimensions: (1) available material and institutional resources, (2) the availability and reliability of alternative allies and patrons, (3) the degree of strategic permissiveness in the regional and systemic environment, (4) the governing elite’s capacity to manage parallel relationships with multiple external actors, and (5) the positional strategies of major allies and adversaries toward the hedging state. Theoretically, the article conceptualizes hedging not as a stable middle position between balancing and bandwagoning, but as a dynamic “portfolio strategy” whose sustainability depends on how these five dimensions jointly structure room for maneuver. Empirically, it employs a comparative case-study design combining process-tracing of critical junctures with analysis of trade, investment, security cooperation, and elite discourse in the three countries. The findings show that Azerbaijan’s resource endowments and diversified patronage network, combined with a relatively permissive regional environment, have enabled a successful, regime-protective hedging strategy. Armenia, by contrast, illustrates a reactive and security-driven form of hedging under conditions of asymmetric vulnerability: perceived unreliability of its traditional security patron has widened incentives for diversification, but the strategy remains constrained by limited material resources, restricted strategic depth, and a coercive neighborhood shaped by Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s leverage. While Armenia has sought to rebalance its external portfolio through selective normative and institutional reorientation and by cultivating alternative partners, the availability of credible hard-security guarantees remains thin, and institutional re-embedding is partial—producing a hedging posture that is politically salient yet structurally fragile. Georgia, in turn, highlights the fragility of hedging under conditions of high Western normative pressure and shrinking domestic resources, a closing strategic environment, and increasingly restrictive preferences of both Russia and Western partners—leading the country toward strategic irrelevance and self-isolation. The article contributes to hedging theory by specifying the conditions under which hedging strategies are likely to be durable, self-undermining, or forced into de facto realignment. It also derives policy implications for the EU and other external actors seeking to support resilient, autonomy-preserving foreign policies in small states exposed to great-power rivalry.

This article explains why hedging strategies by small secondary states in Eurasia succeed in some contexts but fail or collapse in others. Focusing on Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, it argues that variation in hedging outcomes is driven by the interaction of five dimensions: (1) available material and institutional resources, (2) the availability and reliability of alternative allies and patrons, (3) the degree of strategic permissiveness in the regional and systemic environment, (4) the governing elite’s capacity to manage parallel relationships with multiple external actors, and (5) the positional strategies of major allies and adversaries toward the hedging state. Theoretically, the article conceptualizes hedging not as a stable middle position between balancing and bandwagoning, but as a dynamic “portfolio strategy” whose sustainability depends on how these five dimensions jointly structure room for maneuver. Empirically, it employs a comparative case-study design combining process-tracing of critical junctures with analysis of trade, investment, security cooperation, and elite discourse in the three countries. The findings show that Azerbaijan’s resource endowments and diversified patronage network, combined with a relatively permissive regional environment, have enabled a successful, regime-protective hedging strategy. Armenia, by contrast, illustrates a reactive and security-driven form of hedging under conditions of asymmetric vulnerability: perceived unreliability of its traditional security patron has widened incentives for diversification, but the strategy remains constrained by limited material resources, restricted strategic depth, and a coercive neighborhood shaped by Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s leverage. While Armenia has sought to rebalance its external portfolio through selective normative and institutional reorientation and by cultivating alternative partners, the availability of credible hard-security guarantees remains thin, and institutional re-embedding is partial—producing a hedging posture that is politically salient yet structurally fragile. Georgia, in turn, highlights the fragility of hedging under conditions of high Western normative pressure and shrinking domestic resources, a closing strategic environment, and increasingly restrictive preferences of both Russia and Western partners—leading the country toward strategic irrelevance and self-isolation. The article contributes to hedging theory by specifying the conditions under which hedging strategies are likely to be durable, self-undermining, or forced into de facto realignment. It also derives policy implications for the EU and other external actors seeking to support resilient, autonomy-preserving foreign policies in small states exposed to great-power rivalry.