In this paper, I use my empirical work with late Soviet city symbols as a basis for a theoretical discussion of power and agency in the late Soviet Union. I demonstrate the agency potential of peripheral actors, with peripherality understood as being secondary to the dominant actors controlling the power structure in terms of access to resources and freedom of action. My thinking about peripheral agency started from the seminal Practise of Everyday Life where de Certeau describes tactics [of peripheral actors] in opposition to strategies [of dominant actors]. In reality tactics and strategies can be the same actions. The distinction is that in a relational setting tactical agency of the peripheral actor operates within and around structures devised and controlled by the strategies of the dominant actors. I expand the application of tactical agency from Certeauvian examples of individual uses of the humble citizen-consumer to the behaviours of empowered, yet peripheral actors. I demonstrate that such actors can gain influence on the national scale and establish discourses not on tactical, but on operational level, to borrow from military theory. I demonstrate that the expansion in scale and effect from tactical to operational level was possible because in the late Soviet Union dominant actors were losing their control of the discursive field and structures of governance. To maximise the productivity of Certeauvian tactics, such as poaching and appropriation, I expand their applicability beyond the scale of individual human actors. This allows to discuss poaching as performed by a peripheral discourse on a dominant discursive configuration. Thus, the peripheral discourse of the Heraldic Revival accrued legitimacy by poaching on the ideology of return to Leninist roots as well as practices of direct socialism elaborated and popularised by the dominant agents during the period of the Thaw. A similar expansion of appropriation opens a discussion of urban and national spaces’ encroachment on the Soviet symbolic space. Thus, by adopting their heraldic symbols peripheral localities created symbolic boundaries that separated them from the centrally produced Soviet space. Soviet cities appropriated the space that had been previously imagined and regulated by the centre, and produced substate, that is, national, regional and urban imaginaries that complicated, limited, and in some ways destroyed the Soviet symbolic space.

At the end of the Cold War, the former Eastern and Central European socialist countries were widely perceived as being on an inevitable path toward democracy. The """"End of History"""" (Fukuyama) – the apparent triumph of liberal democracy – shaped Western expectations. Developments in Russia, the largest successor state of the Soviet Union, also seemed to confirm the move away from authoritarianism. Russia's first president, Boris Yeltsin, declared a democratic transition to be one of his central policy objectives and initiated far-reaching political and economic reforms. Western governments widely supported Yeltsin and expressed confidence that his policies would lead to a free, democratic, and liberal Russia. Following German reunification and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Germany emerged as Russia's closest partner in the West. Leading German politicians and officials viewed Yeltsin as a reformer who """"embodied a reform agenda toward democracy and a market economy"""" (Bundesarchiv, B 136/42728, April 25, 1993). As a high-ranking official in the German Foreign Office emphasized internally, """"any alternative to Yeltsin can only be negative"""" (Ibid., December 11, 1992). In a highly uncertain political environment, the German government effectively placed all its bets on Yeltsin. This positive assessment persisted despite early signs of illiberal and undemocratic developments. During the constitutional crisis of 1993, Yeltsin's use of military force against the parliament did not diminish German support: Chancellor Helmut Kohl attributed the violence solely to radical opposition forces. Even the brutal war in Chechnya (1994-1996) did not fundamentally alter the German government's supportive stance. While Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel acknowledged Russia's violations of human rights and international law, he simultaneously underlined Germany's intention to remain Russia's """"partner and friend"""". Kinkel stressed that Germany was """"counting on the current government to continue its reform agenda"""" (Bundestag, session of January 19, 1995, p. 638). On this basis, the German government maintained its support for Yeltsin and even provided assistance during the 1996 presidential election campaign. It therefore ignored the authoritarian dimensions of Yeltsin's rule or interpreted them merely as minor obstacles on the path toward a shared democratic and peaceful future. This paper wants to examine to what extent the """"transition paradigm"""" (Carothers) shaped the perceptions and policies of key actors within the German government. Drawing on archival sources from the German Foreign Office and the Federal Chancellery, it asks whether Germany's Russia policy was driven by ideological convictions and wishful thinking rather than by thorough political analyses. If so, how did policymakers reconcile evident authoritarian tendencies with their sustained belief in Yeltsin?

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia on December 31, 1992, is frequently cited in international relations as a model of a peaceful """"Velvet Divorce."""" However, from the internal perspective of the newly established Slovak Republic, the dawn of independence was marked not by triumph, but by profound existential and political uncertainties. This paper aligns with the ceecon theme by analyzing the """"accidental"""" nature of Slovak sovereignty—a statehood that arrived not through a mass national movement or a legitimizing referendum, but via elite-driven decisions, often executed against the prevailing public sentiment. Drawing on discourse analysis and historical data, this presentation explores three dimensions of uncertainty that defined the first decade of the Slovak Republic. First, it examines legitimacy uncertainty. Faced with a populace where only a minority actively supported the federation's dissolution, the new political elites resorted to """"constitutional nationalism."""" By shifting the constitutional preamble from a civic definition (""""We, the citizens"""") to an ethnic one (""""We, the Slovak nation""""), the state attempted to manufacture certainty through ethnic consolidation, effectively positioning itself as an """"ethnic democracy."""" Second, the paper investigates the uncertainty of memory. Lacking a universally accepted """"Golden Age"""" or """"Great Epoch,"""" post-1993 Slovakia engaged in an intense struggle to define a """"useable past."""" This resulted in a clash between two competing historical narratives: the democratic, anti-fascist tradition of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising (SNP) versus the nationalist apologetics of the 1939–1945 Slovak State. The analysis highlights how state symbols—including the iconography of new currency featuring religious figures and medieval rulers—were curated to construct a narrative of ancient continuity to offset the perceived fragility of the modern state. Finally, the presentation addresses security perceptions and the role of the """"Other."""" It argues that the """"Hungarian question"""" was instrumentalized to consolidate Slovak identity. The perceived uncertainty regarding the loyalty of the Hungarian minority became a paradoxical source of negative integration, providing a clear (albeit exclusionary) definition of the nation. The paper concludes that the stability of the early Slovak Republic was achieved not by resolving these uncertainties, but by institutionalizing them within the state's symbolic and legal framework.

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia on December 31, 1992, is frequently cited in international relations as a model of a peaceful """"Velvet Divorce."""" However, from the internal perspective of the newly established Slovak Republic, the dawn of independence was marked not by triumph, but by profound existential and political uncertainties. This paper aligns with the ceecon theme by analyzing the """"accidental"""" nature of Slovak sovereignty—a statehood that arrived not through a mass national movement or a legitimizing referendum, but via elite-driven decisions, often executed against the prevailing public sentiment. Drawing on discourse analysis and historical data, this presentation explores three dimensions of uncertainty that defined the first decade of the Slovak Republic. First, it examines legitimacy uncertainty. Faced with a populace where only a minority actively supported the federation's dissolution, the new political elites resorted to """"constitutional nationalism."""" By shifting the constitutional preamble from a civic definition (""""We, the citizens"""") to an ethnic one (""""We, the Slovak nation""""), the state attempted to manufacture certainty through ethnic consolidation, effectively positioning itself as an """"ethnic democracy."""" Second, the paper investigates the uncertainty of memory. Lacking a universally accepted """"Golden Age"""" or """"Great Epoch,"""" post-1993 Slovakia engaged in an intense struggle to define a """"useable past."""" This resulted in a clash between two competing historical narratives: the democratic, anti-fascist tradition of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising (SNP) versus the nationalist apologetics of the 1939–1945 Slovak State. The analysis highlights how state symbols—including the iconography of new currency featuring religious figures and medieval rulers—were curated to construct a narrative of ancient continuity to offset the perceived fragility of the modern state. Finally, the presentation addresses security perceptions and the role of the """"Other."""" It argues that the """"Hungarian question"""" was instrumentalized to consolidate Slovak identity. The perceived uncertainty regarding the loyalty of the Hungarian minority became a paradoxical source of negative integration, providing a clear (albeit exclusionary) definition of the nation. The paper concludes that the stability of the early Slovak Republic was achieved not by resolving these uncertainties, but by institutionalizing them within the state's symbolic and legal framework.

Debates over marijuana legalization in Europe reveal deep societal uncertainties regarding law, health, and social order. In post-socialist contexts such as Latvia, these uncertainties are compounded by historical legacies and institutional frameworks inherited from the Soviet period. While Western European debates often emphasize individual freedoms and human rights, Eastern European discussions tend to balance considerations of social health, regulation, and collective risk. Latvia offers a unique lens to explore how post-socialist societies navigate such uncertainties in the context of contested policy change. This paper situates marijuana legalization debates within broader European comparative perspectives, highlighting the contrast between post-socialist caution and Western liberal experimentation. It emphasizes the uncertainties inherent in both public opinion and policy outcomes: it remains unclear how societal attitudes will evolve, how regulatory frameworks may adapt, and what the broader social consequences of legalization could be. These questions underscore a fundamental tension between historical legacies and emerging socio-political pressures, reflecting how societies live with and respond to uncertainty. To contribute empirical insight, the paper draws on ongoing survey research in Latvia. Preliminary survey data will be presented to illustrate the work in progress, without preempting conclusions, as public attitudes are still under investigation and the debate remains open-ended. The focus lies on exploring the cognitive and normative frameworks shaping discussion, rather than presenting finalized findings. By foregrounding post-socialist uncertainties, this study offers a perspective on how societies negotiate risk, moral reasoning, and social stability in transitional contexts. It highlights that legalization debates are not solely about policy choice or individual rights, but also about the ways in which uncertainty is managed, contested, and interpreted in societies negotiating the tension between past legacies and potential futures.