The paper examines the ambiguities in interpretation of the EUropean norms in Georgia by tracing how the EU has been framed across shifting domestic discourses under the United National Movement (2004-2012) and the Georgian Dream (since 2012) governments. The study uncovers the puzzle why Georgia turned away from the integration process through norms contestation via the populist-conservative discourse and argues that explanations must go beyond external incentives and concentrate on the EU’s framing through national narratives of the domestic agencies. Using narrative analysis and drawing on a qualitative content analysis of official documents and discourse analysis through speech act analysis, the dominant pro-Western and conservative/anti-Western narratives are deconstructed through critical constructivism, highlighting discursive structures / discursive mismatches that bifurcate the EU under the Georgian Dream rule through false juxtaposition of liberal Brussels vs. conservative Budapest as alternative value centers in collision of supranational vs. national agencies in the EU hierarchy.

The paper examines the ambiguities in interpretation of the EUropean norms in Georgia by tracing how the EU has been framed across shifting domestic discourses under the United National Movement (2004-2012) and the Georgian Dream (since 2012) governments. The study uncovers the puzzle why Georgia turned away from the integration process through norms contestation via the populist-conservative discourse and argues that explanations must go beyond external incentives and concentrate on the EU’s framing through national narratives of the domestic agencies. Using narrative analysis and drawing on a qualitative content analysis of official documents and discourse analysis through speech act analysis, the dominant pro-Western and conservative/anti-Western narratives are deconstructed through critical constructivism, highlighting discursive structures / discursive mismatches that bifurcate the EU under the Georgian Dream rule through false juxtaposition of liberal Brussels vs. conservative Budapest as alternative value centers in collision of supranational vs. national agencies in the EU hierarchy.

Since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Georgia has experienced an accelerated shift from hybrid governance toward competitive authoritarianism. The ruling Georgian Dream has adopted an openly anti-Western rhetoric while simultaneously consolidating control through the “Foreign Agents” law, the detention of leading opposition figures, large-scale repression of protests, dismissals of civil servants based on political loyalty, regulatory pressure on critical media, and highly contested parliamentary elections whose results were rejected by all opposition parties that crossed the electoral threshold. These developments have sharply constrained traditional channels of political mobilisation and organisation. This paper addresses the following puzzle: how do opposition parties maintain political relevance and organisational survival when physical mobilisation is costly, resources are scarce, and repression is selective but persistent? While existing scholarship shows that digital tools may strengthen participation in democratic contexts or enable surveillance and control in authoritarian regimes, less is known about how opposition actors strategically adapt digital infrastructures to sustain resilience amid gradual autocratization. The study examines whether and how digitalisation functions as a substitute arena for political competition, coordination, and visibility in contemporary Georgia. It asks: (1) What digital strategies do opposition parties adopt in response to shrinking offline opportunities? (2) How do these strategies differ across parties with distinct organisational legacies and resource bases? and (3) do digital tools primarily enhance mobilisation, internal coordination, narrative control, or international signalling? Empirically, the paper compares four opposition actors: Lelo, Coalition for Change, the Federalists, and the United National Movement. The analysis combines systematic mapping of party activity across major digital platforms with semi-structured interviews with party leaders, MPs, and digital communication staff conducted in 2024–2025. The findings show that digitalisation has become a core survival strategy rather than a supplementary campaign tool. Parties increasingly prioritise low-cost digital mobilisation, micro-targeted messaging, leader-centred video formats, and encrypted coordination channels to compensate for limited access to television, financial constraints, and risks associated with street politics. At the same time, digital reliance generates new vulnerabilities, including platform dependency, algorithmic visibility constraints, and exposure to ruling elite-aligned disinformation. The paper argues that opposition to digitalisation in Georgia reflects neither democratic deepening nor full digital authoritarianism, but an intermediate form of “defensive digital adaptation” characteristic of early-stage autocratization.

Since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Georgia has experienced an accelerated shift from hybrid governance toward competitive authoritarianism. The ruling Georgian Dream has adopted an openly anti-Western rhetoric while simultaneously consolidating control through the “Foreign Agents” law, the detention of leading opposition figures, large-scale repression of protests, dismissals of civil servants based on political loyalty, regulatory pressure on critical media, and highly contested parliamentary elections whose results were rejected by all opposition parties that crossed the electoral threshold. These developments have sharply constrained traditional channels of political mobilisation and organisation. This paper addresses the following puzzle: how do opposition parties maintain political relevance and organisational survival when physical mobilisation is costly, resources are scarce, and repression is selective but persistent? While existing scholarship shows that digital tools may strengthen participation in democratic contexts or enable surveillance and control in authoritarian regimes, less is known about how opposition actors strategically adapt digital infrastructures to sustain resilience amid gradual autocratization. The study examines whether and how digitalisation functions as a substitute arena for political competition, coordination, and visibility in contemporary Georgia. It asks: (1) What digital strategies do opposition parties adopt in response to shrinking offline opportunities? (2) How do these strategies differ across parties with distinct organisational legacies and resource bases? and (3) do digital tools primarily enhance mobilisation, internal coordination, narrative control, or international signalling? Empirically, the paper compares four opposition actors: Lelo, Coalition for Change, the Federalists, and the United National Movement. The analysis combines systematic mapping of party activity across major digital platforms with semi-structured interviews with party leaders, MPs, and digital communication staff conducted in 2024–2025. The findings show that digitalisation has become a core survival strategy rather than a supplementary campaign tool. Parties increasingly prioritise low-cost digital mobilisation, micro-targeted messaging, leader-centred video formats, and encrypted coordination channels to compensate for limited access to television, financial constraints, and risks associated with street politics. At the same time, digital reliance generates new vulnerabilities, including platform dependency, algorithmic visibility constraints, and exposure to ruling elite-aligned disinformation. The paper argues that opposition to digitalisation in Georgia reflects neither democratic deepening nor full digital authoritarianism, but an intermediate form of “defensive digital adaptation” characteristic of early-stage autocratization.

Since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Georgia has experienced an accelerated shift from hybrid governance toward competitive authoritarianism. The ruling Georgian Dream has adopted an openly anti-Western rhetoric while simultaneously consolidating control through the “Foreign Agents” law, the detention of leading opposition figures, large-scale repression of protests, dismissals of civil servants based on political loyalty, regulatory pressure on critical media, and highly contested parliamentary elections whose results were rejected by all opposition parties that crossed the electoral threshold. These developments have sharply constrained traditional channels of political mobilisation and organisation. This paper addresses the following puzzle: how do opposition parties maintain political relevance and organisational survival when physical mobilisation is costly, resources are scarce, and repression is selective but persistent? While existing scholarship shows that digital tools may strengthen participation in democratic contexts or enable surveillance and control in authoritarian regimes, less is known about how opposition actors strategically adapt digital infrastructures to sustain resilience amid gradual autocratization. The study examines whether and how digitalisation functions as a substitute arena for political competition, coordination, and visibility in contemporary Georgia. It asks: (1) What digital strategies do opposition parties adopt in response to shrinking offline opportunities? (2) How do these strategies differ across parties with distinct organisational legacies and resource bases? and (3) do digital tools primarily enhance mobilisation, internal coordination, narrative control, or international signalling? Empirically, the paper compares four opposition actors: Lelo, Coalition for Change, the Federalists, and the United National Movement. The analysis combines systematic mapping of party activity across major digital platforms with semi-structured interviews with party leaders, MPs, and digital communication staff conducted in 2024–2025. The findings show that digitalisation has become a core survival strategy rather than a supplementary campaign tool. Parties increasingly prioritise low-cost digital mobilisation, micro-targeted messaging, leader-centred video formats, and encrypted coordination channels to compensate for limited access to television, financial constraints, and risks associated with street politics. At the same time, digital reliance generates new vulnerabilities, including platform dependency, algorithmic visibility constraints, and exposure to ruling elite-aligned disinformation. The paper argues that opposition to digitalisation in Georgia reflects neither democratic deepening nor full digital authoritarianism, but an intermediate form of “defensive digital adaptation” characteristic of early-stage autocratization.