The paper examines the ambiguities in interpretation of the EUropean norms in Georgia by tracing how the EU has been framed across shifting domestic discourses under the United National Movement (2004-2012) and the Georgian Dream (since 2012) governments. The study uncovers the puzzle why Georgia turned away from the integration process through norms contestation via the populist-conservative discourse and argues that explanations must go beyond external incentives and concentrate on the EU’s framing through national narratives of the domestic agencies. Using narrative analysis and drawing on a qualitative content analysis of official documents and discourse analysis through speech act analysis, the dominant pro-Western and conservative/anti-Western narratives are deconstructed through critical constructivism, highlighting discursive structures / discursive mismatches that bifurcate the EU under the Georgian Dream rule through false juxtaposition of liberal Brussels vs. conservative Budapest as alternative value centers in collision of supranational vs. national agencies in the EU hierarchy.

The paper examines the ambiguities in interpretation of the EUropean norms in Georgia by tracing how the EU has been framed across shifting domestic discourses under the United National Movement (2004-2012) and the Georgian Dream (since 2012) governments. The study uncovers the puzzle why Georgia turned away from the integration process through norms contestation via the populist-conservative discourse and argues that explanations must go beyond external incentives and concentrate on the EU’s framing through national narratives of the domestic agencies. Using narrative analysis and drawing on a qualitative content analysis of official documents and discourse analysis through speech act analysis, the dominant pro-Western and conservative/anti-Western narratives are deconstructed through critical constructivism, highlighting discursive structures / discursive mismatches that bifurcate the EU under the Georgian Dream rule through false juxtaposition of liberal Brussels vs. conservative Budapest as alternative value centers in collision of supranational vs. national agencies in the EU hierarchy.

This report examines the recent transformation of Georgia from a hybrid regime into an increasingly authoritarian political system against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical rivalry in the South Caucasus. In line with the conference theme of (Un)Certainties, it focuses on how growing regional and global uncertainties—most notably Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine—have reshaped Georgia’s domestic political order and foreign policy orientation. Once widely perceived as a “beacon of democracy” in the post-Soviet space, Georgia has, over a short period, exhibited clear signs of authoritarian consolidation driven by both internal power structures and external geopolitical pressures. The report argues that the war in Ukraine became a crucial catalyst for the acceleration of authoritarian tendencies in Georgia. Confronted with a rapidly changing security environment and the emergence of a new world order, the ruling elite chose to abandon democratic commitments and initiate the construction of an authoritarian political system. At the same time, Georgia’s foreign policy course has undergone a significant shift: instead of deepening cooperation with the European Union and the United States, the country has increasingly moved closer to authoritarian actors such as Russia, China, and Iran. The report emphasizes the direct connection between domestic authoritarian strengthening and foreign policy reorientation, showing that the consolidation of authoritarian rule is accompanied by Georgia’s growing estrangement from the West. The report analyzes repressive legislation adopted over the past two years that has restricted civil liberties, weakened democratic institutions, and undermined political pluralism. Special attention is paid to the informal nature of power in Georgia, where an oligarchic leader without any official position exercises decisive influence over all branches of government. This system of informal governance has become a key feature of Georgia’s authoritarian transformation. Furthermore, the report discusses the concept of “sovereign democracy,” borrowed from Russian political discourse, and its adaptation to the Georgian context. It demonstrates how this concept is used to legitimize political repression under the guise of protecting sovereignty from external influence, while simultaneously facilitating the expansion of Russian influence in Georgia. The report also examines the mechanisms through which the ruling regime maintains stability, including political blackmail of Western partners, disinformation campaigns, conspiracy theories, and the manipulation of economic issues. Particular emphasis is placed on how the regime exploits the war in the region and international sanctions against Russia to justify authoritarian tightening and consolidate its power.

Since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Georgia has experienced an accelerated shift from hybrid governance toward competitive authoritarianism. The ruling Georgian Dream has adopted an openly anti-Western rhetoric while simultaneously consolidating control through the “Foreign Agents” law, the detention of leading opposition figures, large-scale repression of protests, dismissals of civil servants based on political loyalty, regulatory pressure on critical media, and highly contested parliamentary elections whose results were rejected by all opposition parties that crossed the electoral threshold. These developments have sharply constrained traditional channels of political mobilisation and organisation. This paper addresses the following puzzle: how do opposition parties maintain political relevance and organisational survival when physical mobilisation is costly, resources are scarce, and repression is selective but persistent? While existing scholarship shows that digital tools may strengthen participation in democratic contexts or enable surveillance and control in authoritarian regimes, less is known about how opposition actors strategically adapt digital infrastructures to sustain resilience amid gradual autocratization. The study examines whether and how digitalisation functions as a substitute arena for political competition, coordination, and visibility in contemporary Georgia. It asks: (1) What digital strategies do opposition parties adopt in response to shrinking offline opportunities? (2) How do these strategies differ across parties with distinct organisational legacies and resource bases? and (3) do digital tools primarily enhance mobilisation, internal coordination, narrative control, or international signalling? Empirically, the paper compares four opposition actors: Lelo, Coalition for Change, the Federalists, and the United National Movement. The analysis combines systematic mapping of party activity across major digital platforms with semi-structured interviews with party leaders, MPs, and digital communication staff conducted in 2024–2025. The findings show that digitalisation has become a core survival strategy rather than a supplementary campaign tool. Parties increasingly prioritise low-cost digital mobilisation, micro-targeted messaging, leader-centred video formats, and encrypted coordination channels to compensate for limited access to television, financial constraints, and risks associated with street politics. At the same time, digital reliance generates new vulnerabilities, including platform dependency, algorithmic visibility constraints, and exposure to ruling elite-aligned disinformation. The paper argues that opposition to digitalisation in Georgia reflects neither democratic deepening nor full digital authoritarianism, but an intermediate form of “defensive digital adaptation” characteristic of early-stage autocratization.

Since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Georgia has experienced an accelerated shift from hybrid governance toward competitive authoritarianism. The ruling Georgian Dream has adopted an openly anti-Western rhetoric while simultaneously consolidating control through the “Foreign Agents” law, the detention of leading opposition figures, large-scale repression of protests, dismissals of civil servants based on political loyalty, regulatory pressure on critical media, and highly contested parliamentary elections whose results were rejected by all opposition parties that crossed the electoral threshold. These developments have sharply constrained traditional channels of political mobilisation and organisation. This paper addresses the following puzzle: how do opposition parties maintain political relevance and organisational survival when physical mobilisation is costly, resources are scarce, and repression is selective but persistent? While existing scholarship shows that digital tools may strengthen participation in democratic contexts or enable surveillance and control in authoritarian regimes, less is known about how opposition actors strategically adapt digital infrastructures to sustain resilience amid gradual autocratization. The study examines whether and how digitalisation functions as a substitute arena for political competition, coordination, and visibility in contemporary Georgia. It asks: (1) What digital strategies do opposition parties adopt in response to shrinking offline opportunities? (2) How do these strategies differ across parties with distinct organisational legacies and resource bases? and (3) do digital tools primarily enhance mobilisation, internal coordination, narrative control, or international signalling? Empirically, the paper compares four opposition actors: Lelo, Coalition for Change, the Federalists, and the United National Movement. The analysis combines systematic mapping of party activity across major digital platforms with semi-structured interviews with party leaders, MPs, and digital communication staff conducted in 2024–2025. The findings show that digitalisation has become a core survival strategy rather than a supplementary campaign tool. Parties increasingly prioritise low-cost digital mobilisation, micro-targeted messaging, leader-centred video formats, and encrypted coordination channels to compensate for limited access to television, financial constraints, and risks associated with street politics. At the same time, digital reliance generates new vulnerabilities, including platform dependency, algorithmic visibility constraints, and exposure to ruling elite-aligned disinformation. The paper argues that opposition to digitalisation in Georgia reflects neither democratic deepening nor full digital authoritarianism, but an intermediate form of “defensive digital adaptation” characteristic of early-stage autocratization.

Since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Georgia has experienced an accelerated shift from hybrid governance toward competitive authoritarianism. The ruling Georgian Dream has adopted an openly anti-Western rhetoric while simultaneously consolidating control through the “Foreign Agents” law, the detention of leading opposition figures, large-scale repression of protests, dismissals of civil servants based on political loyalty, regulatory pressure on critical media, and highly contested parliamentary elections whose results were rejected by all opposition parties that crossed the electoral threshold. These developments have sharply constrained traditional channels of political mobilisation and organisation. This paper addresses the following puzzle: how do opposition parties maintain political relevance and organisational survival when physical mobilisation is costly, resources are scarce, and repression is selective but persistent? While existing scholarship shows that digital tools may strengthen participation in democratic contexts or enable surveillance and control in authoritarian regimes, less is known about how opposition actors strategically adapt digital infrastructures to sustain resilience amid gradual autocratization. The study examines whether and how digitalisation functions as a substitute arena for political competition, coordination, and visibility in contemporary Georgia. It asks: (1) What digital strategies do opposition parties adopt in response to shrinking offline opportunities? (2) How do these strategies differ across parties with distinct organisational legacies and resource bases? and (3) do digital tools primarily enhance mobilisation, internal coordination, narrative control, or international signalling? Empirically, the paper compares four opposition actors: Lelo, Coalition for Change, the Federalists, and the United National Movement. The analysis combines systematic mapping of party activity across major digital platforms with semi-structured interviews with party leaders, MPs, and digital communication staff conducted in 2024–2025. The findings show that digitalisation has become a core survival strategy rather than a supplementary campaign tool. Parties increasingly prioritise low-cost digital mobilisation, micro-targeted messaging, leader-centred video formats, and encrypted coordination channels to compensate for limited access to television, financial constraints, and risks associated with street politics. At the same time, digital reliance generates new vulnerabilities, including platform dependency, algorithmic visibility constraints, and exposure to ruling elite-aligned disinformation. The paper argues that opposition to digitalisation in Georgia reflects neither democratic deepening nor full digital authoritarianism, but an intermediate form of “defensive digital adaptation” characteristic of early-stage autocratization.

This research examines how Georgia's ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), has instrumentalized sovereignty discourse to legitimize authoritarian consolidation and dramatic foreign policy shift, while pursuing neoliberal economic policies. Since the disputed October 2024 parliamentary elections, Georgia has experienced a profound political crisis characterized by ongoing street protests and contested governmental legitimacy. The GD government, led by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, strategically weaponizes sovereignty rhetoric while simultaneously undermining the country's resilience and autonomy through deepening economic relations with Russia and China and pursuing neoliberal policies that challenge popular sovereignty. GD's sovereignty discourse reveals a fundamental contradiction: while its cultural and political dimensions oppose Western influence, its economic base remains firmly neoliberal. Neoliberal policies undermine sovereignty through deregulation and economic extractivism, exemplified by Georgia's openness to international capital. Georgia represents an extreme case of sovereignty's relativity in peripheral states, characterized by dependency on foreign capital, currency, and goods. Russian and Chinese economic penetration has intensified since Ukraine's invasion, with Russian capital controlling strategic infrastructure. International responses—EU accession suspension and US sanctions—have effectively halted Georgia's European integration. The instrumentalization of sovereignty by GD proves remarkably compatible with neoliberalism for several reasons. The GD government selectively targets the EU while avoiding criticism of multilateral development banks, as well as stays on good terms with International Financial Institutions like the IMF and World Bank. The money flowing from these institutions to fund various infrastructure or other projects not only align with government interests, but also helps stabilize both the economy and authoritarian power of the GD. Local businesses support the regime as long as their activities remain undisturbed, while international investors continue prioritizing macroeconomic stability over democratic governance, attracted by Georgia's deregulated, business-friendly environment. This study maps sovereignty discourses among diverse actors over five years, analysing how International Financial Institutions, multilateral development banks, international investors, local businesses, and local civil society interact with the authoritarian government. The research addresses critical questions: Why does sovereignty discourse serve GD's authoritarian project? What happens when economic actors continue business-as-usual with authoritarian regimes? Contextualized within post-Soviet transition, crisis of liberar older and geopolitical upheaval, this research illuminates how authoritarian regimes exploit sovereignty discourse while pursuing neoliberal policies that fundamentally contradict popular sovereignty.