How do citizens form democratic attitudes in post-communist societies? Which socialization mechanisms shape the development of liberal democratic orientations in Czechia? By conceptualizing political socialization as a relational and intergenerational process embedded in everyday family life, this study challenges dominant approaches in the political culture and regime socialization literatures, which emphasize either stable cultural predispositions or top-down regime effects. Using a mixed-methods crucial case research design (in contrast with other countries in the region, Czechia has thus far resisted de-democratization), the study examines both the sources and mechanisms of democratic attitude formation across generations and within families. Drawing on new nationally representative survey data from 2,000 Czech respondents (half socialized before the democratic transition and half after), the analysis employs structural equation modeling to estimate direct and indirect effects and to assess the relative importance of different agents of socialization in a post-communist context. To unpack the mechanisms underlying these patterns, the quantitative analysis is supplemented by parent–child dyadic survey and in-depth dyadic interviews, which allow for a detailed examination of both intergenerational congruence and change in democratic attitudes as well as other family-based mechanisms of socialization. The study’s central theoretical contribution lies in opening the “black box” of the family and demonstrating that democratic attitudes are not merely inherited cultural traits nor simply products of regime exposure, but are actively reproduced, negotiated, and transformed through everyday family practices beyond explicit political discussion. By linking micro-level socialization processes to macro-level historical rupture, the study advances a process-oriented account of democratic attitude formation that helps explain sources of democratic resilience in the post-communist region.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a turning point for the South Caucasus. It increased geopolitical uncertainty and security concerns across the region. In Georgia, the war reshaped public debates on sovereignty, democracy, and foreign policy orientation. At the same time, it deepened political polarisation and highlighted growing tensions between strong pro-European public attitudes and increasingly illiberal state practices. The ruling Georgian Dream party reversed key steps in the European Union agreement process. Domestically and internationally, these developments have been widely interpreted as signs of democratic backsliding and a gradual shift away from the EU toward closer alignment with Russia. This paper examines changing patterns of youth civic and political engagement in Georgia, focusing on how recent protest mobilisations challenge dominant narratives of political apathy in peripheral regions under conditions of political uncertainty. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork conducted under the Fundamental Project financed by the Shota Rustaveli National Foundation and implemented by the Ilia State University research group (led by Prof. Oliver Reisner, Prof. Ana Kirvalidze, and myself) between 2019 and 2022 in five regional towns: Kutaisi, Zugdidi, Telavi, Akhaltsikhe, and Marneuli the study analyses forms of civic and political participation among Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani youth. While existing studies frequently portray Georgian youth as civically passive, the large-scale protest waves of 2023-2025, especially against the draft law “On Foreign Agents,” reveal moments of increased political mobilisation and cross-regional solidarity in response to perceived democratic threats. The paper argues that youth mobilisation in Georgia tends to emerge in response to observed pragmatic political threats, yet remains largely divided and weakly institutionalised. Existing distrust toward state institutions and broader society limits the translation of protest participation into sustained civic engagement or long-term political organisation. Instead, many young people prioritise individual self-development over continuous involvement in formal or informal political structures. Situating these findings within the broader context of post-Soviet legacies of distrust and fragmented civil society, the paper perceives protest as a temporary form of political unity and identity rather than a stable foundation for social cohesion, highlighting the uncertainty of civic consolidation under conditions of democratic erosion. By focusing on peripheral towns and ethnically diverse youth populations, the study contributes to debates on political mobilisation, democratic erosion, and the conditions under which protest can or cannot foster resilient civic capacity. The findings highlight the ambivalent role of youth protest in shaping Georgia’s challenging and uncertain democratic future.

While a growing body of literature addresses challenges faced by Eastern European migrants, their descendants receive less scholarly attention. Often perceived as ‘invisible’ due to assumptions of seamless integration, they nonetheless encounter stigma and exclusion. Drawing on autobiographical interviews with individuals raised by Polish parents in Germany, this study explores their varied transnational practices in relation to (non)belonging. Many of my interlocutors were highly mobile. During childhood, they moved repeatedly with their parents, both within Germany and within Berlin itself. They traveled to their parents’ country of origin: in childhood, usually for holidays, and in adulthood often as a way of exploring their identity. Some of them relocated to Poland for extended periods or permanently, despite having never previously lived there. Another important experience of mobility for the interviewees was going abroad to study or work. This presentation will demonstrate various meanings of such mobilities through transnational lens: they both reinforced non-belonging and served as a way of coping with it. While local relocations and some holiday trips to Poland during childhood often hindered the formation of stable and secure social connections, the journeys undertaken in adulthood became a way to seek new forms of belonging and self-understanding. Although these travels sometimes led to stigmatization and identity conflicts, they also encouraged self-reflection. In contrast, trips to other countries opened opportunities for self-discovery and the construction of new forms of belonging that transcended national frameworks. The study points to three ways of shaping non-belonging which affected participants’ wellbeing. One key process is the positioning of interlocutors in a state of liminality, where belonging was conditional and required continuous efforts to adapt to family, peer groups, or imagined national communities in Poland and Germany; this created feelings of uncertainty and anxiety about one's social place, as well as exhaustion from the constant effort to meet others' expectations and mask markers of difference. Other experiences of non-belonging were shaped by family narratives and practices that either devalued, rejected, or romanticized connections to parents' country of origin. As a result, some participants actively sought to sever ties with their heritage and family, while for others these bonds became inaccessible or fragile. Some described how the devaluation of belonging contributed to a diminished sense of self-worth. Rejection of belonging also complicated family relationships, leading to feelings of cultural loss or a lack of linguistic and cultural competencies. Meanwhile, imagined belonging was often short-lived, frequently resulting in disappointment, stress, and family tensions.

Over the past few years, international studies have recorded a steady decline in young people’s commitment to democracy, both at the declarative level and in terms of voting. Data from the WVS (waves 5–7) demonstrate that young respondents rate the importance of democracy lower than middle-aged and older cohorts. Similar conclusions regarding increasing tolerance for anti-democratic practices and declining trust in democratic institutions are found in a number of recent academic studies. One of the key factors underlying these developments is young people’s pessimistic expectations about their own future, particularly expectations of downward socio-economic mobility. International studies of young adults’ political attitudes show that negative expectations are associated with a higher likelihood of ideological polarization and self-placement at the extremes of the political spectrum. At the same time, radical (populist) parties actively exploit such pessimism in their communication with young voters, amplifying anxiety about future risks and threats. The influence of populist rhetoric and disinformation narratives is further reinforced by a broader decline in cognitive and informational capacities. Results from the European Citizens’ Knowledge and Attitudes towards Science and Technology study indicate a decline in factual knowledge across EU countries in 2024 compared to 2021, with the most pronounced decrease observed among younger respondents. The decline is evident across most EU member states and is reflected not only in an increase in incorrect responses to factual questions, but also in a growing share of respondents endorsing conspiracy theories. Other international studies consistently report a high propensity among young people to believe in conspiracy theories. Data from the PISA study also indicate a substantial increase in educational underachievement among adolescents in 2022 compared to 2018. Despite these trends, results from the European Youth Survey 2024 show that a majority of young people remain confident in their ability to recognize disinformation. Finally, patterns of risky behavior among young people have also shifted. According to the ESPAD 2024 study, traditional forms of risky behavior (such as alcohol and drug use) are declining, while digital addiction and low levels of mental well-being are increasing – phenomena that are more difficult to detect and address. Taken together, declining levels of factual knowledge, increased susceptibility to conspiracy beliefs, persistent confidence in individual resilience to disinformation, high levels of anxiety, low mental well-being, pessimistic expectations about the future, and weakening democratic orientations create a complex and reinforcing context that heightens young people’s vulnerability during the process of becoming adults. Such a context is likely to be actively exploited by anti-democratic regimes and actors seeking to undermine democratic institutions and norms.