Even as the global economy more widely fragments, it remains the case that China and Russia remain on one side of a geopolitical faultline. They have both been subject to—and have imposed—a wide-range of economic sanctions, technology and dual-use export controls, and other economic measures that serve to de-couple or de-risk their economies with that of the US, the EU, and the wider West. Pre-existing tensions with the West have grown since February 2022, in part due to both the reality and perception of a Sino-Russian strategic alignment, and the continued economic lifeline that China has provided for Russian war activities in Ukraine. Sino-Russian trade, and in particular Russian economic dependence on China, has indeed grown precipitously over the course of the past decade. However, as I argue, economic cooperation between the two countries lacks genuine depth. This is not only due to the structure and direction of this trade (and of their economies), but also due to strategic policy constraints. On both sides, explicit goals and targets related to national economic and technological self-sufficiency, sovereignty and security also limit the relationship. Policy goals related to national economic security have long been an organizing principle for the regimes in China and Russia, well before 2022 (indeed, well before the idea became a legitimated policy pursuit among Western industrialized economies). These goals cover a range of economic domains, including not only highly sensitive technologies with defense implications, but even more basic resource commodities considered of strategic national importance; inter alia, (critical) minerals, agriculture, and even energy. The paper assesses and compares Chinese and Russian approaches to economic and technological sovereignty across several sectors discusses what this more widely means for the current and future depth (or lack thereof) of their overall strategic alignment.

With the West and China in possession of crucial technologies in the digital age, countries dependent on them seek ways to advance technologically in these challenging circumstances. Some of them perceive themselves in this context as “technologically (or digitally) non-aligned”, implying a political non-alignment as well. Others, such as Russia, do not have official access to Western technologies due to sanctions. Since the attack on Ukraine and ensuing sanctions, therefore, Russia has been strengthening existing or looking for new alliances in the Global South. The Russian government and business associations regard India as one of the crucial countries for technological cooperation. They sent a digital diplomatic attaché to this country, strengthened other diplomatic efforts to market Russian technologies and products, with some evidence of success, and bought Indian software to replace Western products. At the same time, Russia continues to purchase Western technologies through so-called parallel imports – imports of sanctioned goods through third countries, such as Kazakhstan, China, Turkey, etc. and relies on open-source technologies. These new alliances and the reliance on Western and open-source technologies are aspects of Russia's industrial and technological policy conducted under the label of "technological sovereignty". This paper examines the role of new alliances with the Global South, particularly with India, in shaping this policy. It addresses three issues: 1. What strategies does Russia use to become an attractive partner for technological cooperation, and how do they relate to the strategy of establishing its own value chains? 2. How are these strategies received by the countries addressed? 3. What consequences of these new alliances for the constellation of (technological) power in the international political order can be identified so far? We study official documents, newspapers, think tank publications and business association reports from Russia and India, as well as expert interviews, to examine these questions. The paper relates to debates on technological and digital sovereignty, as well as innovation diplomacy studies. It argues that technological sovereignty is necessarily relational despite its association with autarky. Even in the case of Russia, it would be wrong to equate "technological sovereignty" with isolationism, even if it is imposed by the West through technological and financial blockades.

Kazakhstan has long championed a multi-vector foreign policy that entails balancing ties with Russia, China, the West, and regional organizations as a means to preserve strategic autonomy and attract foreign investment. In recent years, however, this doctrine has come under renewed scrutiny considering Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, intensifying global polarization, and rising domestic authoritarianism. This presentation revisits the concept of vectorism through the lens of Kazakhstan’s post-2022 trajectory, arguing that rather than being abandoned, multi-vectorism has been reconfigured to serve the dual goals of authoritarian consolidation and international diversification. The presentation places the January 2022 events, mass protests and the subsequent violent crackdown, as a critical juncture that triggered elite reshuffling and accelerated Tokayev’s consolidation of power. It was followed by a wave of symbolic reforms under the “New Kazakhstan” banner, which coincided with renewed diplomatic engagement with Europe, China, and the fellow Central Asian and Turkic countries. While the regime sought to distance itself rhetorically from Moscow and abstained from overt alignment, it remains institutionally embedded in Russia-led projects like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). At the same time deepening its participation in China-led initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). I argue that Kazakhstan’s evolving foreign policy exemplifies authoritarian resilience without isolation. Rather than decoupling from global institutions, the regime has strategically intensified its engagement with multiple partners to reduce overdependence, enhance its international image, and reinforce regime legitimacy at home. This reconfiguration illustrates how foreign policy can be instrumentalized for domestic legitimation in authoritarian contexts. Drawing on empirical examples from institutional reforms, diplomatic shifts, and integration agreements, this lecture highlights the entanglement of domestic politics and foreign alignment. Kazakhstan’s case invites a rethinking of how middle powers in autocratic settings navigate multipolarity, not as passive pawns but as adaptive actors in a fragmented international order.

This paper examines wartime transformations in transnational energy provision and infrastructural development in the Black Sea and Caspian regions, and explores the implications of these transformations for local models of capitalism. Through case studies of ten transnational projects from Eastern Europe through the South Caucasus to Central Asia, the paper argues that these transformations are about the emergence or return of very large state-owned enterprises (SOEs), fusing energy production/import with transportation and distribution; they also imply the relevance of entities such as railway companies and port administrations, which are often a mix of local authorities and local private companies that rent and develop port and railway facilities and lobby governments for further investments and inclusion in transnational projects. The paper further argues that although many of the transnational infrastructure projects (TIPs) in the broader Black and Caspian Seas (BCS) area have gained momentum or were initiated following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there dynamics are shaped by local rivalries and a broader temporal background, as they build on the EU response to Russia’s trade wars against Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries since 2009, Turkey’s post-2009 agency and mission as a “geo-political bridge” in the region, and the rivalry between China and the US following China’s launch of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The TIPs show how the countries undertaking them are not mere “transit” countries between the EU, Russia, and China (as they were rightly regarded so until 2009), but that they have become capable of industrial strategizing, profiting from their “interstitial” position between these greater powers.

Russia’s wartime economy created its own winners and losers. The winners include the industrial working class which benefited from the new employment opportunities in the military-industrial complex and the overall increase in demand for industrial labor. The winners are also geographically concentrated in the regions with a high concentration of military production. Losers include public sector employees, such as doctors and teachers, as public services have been underfunded relative to the war machine. Large post-industrial cities, especially Moscow and Saint-Petersburg, have also lost since 2022. Their economies, although large and flexible, suffered from the breakdown of international ties. The paper provides an empirical analysis of these trends, relying on government statistics. Using the data on the military facilities in Russia, I demonstrate that higher regional concentration of military production is associated with stronger regional wage growth during the war years. Understanding the distributive and redistributive effects of the Russian government’s military-Keynesian policies is important because it sheds light on the durability of popular support for the Russian regime and its war, with public attitudes being strongly influenced by economic performance.